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Executive Secretary
24 June 1985

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EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MANILA, PHILIPPINES

Executive Registry
May 14, 1985

85-9519

Mr. William J. Casey Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill,

Enclosed is a copy of the speech I mentioned to you.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Stephen W. Bosworth

Ambassador

Enclosure:

Speech before the Rotary Club of Makati West, October 25, 1984

October 25, 1984

AMBASSADOR STEPHEN W. BOSWORTH'S SPEECH
BEFORE THE ROTARY CLUB OF MAKATI WEST

THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL--THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE

I would like to speak to you today about democracy and the role which it plays in United States foreign policy.

Our confidence in democracy and in the rule of law in our approach to the rest of the world is, of course, a projection of our own national experience. Beyond that, however, it has proven to be an effective force--perhaps the most effective force--in our foreign policy. We emphasize our support for democracy not only because our own experience gives us great sympathy for the democratic aspirations of other people. We have also become convinced through hard experience that our own national interests are best served through the creation and strengthening of functioning pluralistic democracies in other countries.

Democracy serves as the essential link between our view of ourselves as a nation and our concept of our responsibilities as a global power. Global power and the responsibilities that go with it are still relatively new experiences for the United States. These are burdens which we assumed reluctantly. Indeed for the first 150 odd years of our existence, sheltered by two oceans, we concentrated almost exclusively on the development of our own nation. But the relentless advance of technology with all its implications for global peace, and the irreversible interdependence of the world economy drew us permanently out of our isolationism.

Our approach toward the rest of the world is based on the reality that our own security and prosperity require our constructive engagement in the world beyond our own frontiers. Realism compels us to recognize that we are locked in a global competition with forces whose objectives and methods are diametrically opposed to the values on which our own society is based. Yet, realism and concern for the future of humanity also compel us to search for ways to manage that global competition peacefully, while we maintain the strength necessary to deter aggression by our adversary.

Realism also compels us to recognize that our own economic well-being can be threatened by disruption of oil supplies, by debt crises in countries which have borrowed in our capital markets, or by a contraction of the world trade on which a large and growing number of American workers and farmers depend for their livelihood.

But we have also learned that for us, because of our own national experience, an approach toward the rest of the world based only on a calculation of our own self-interest is inadequate. We are, for better or for worse, a product of our own national experience. Our country was settled by people seeking religious and political freedom. Our independence was won by Americans seeking self-government and determined to control their own future. The struggle for the independence of the United States was in a sense a rebellion against the elitist principles of eighteenth century Europe. That same egalitarianism continues to mark our society today, and it inevitably shapes our approach toward the rest of the world.

We are a curious tribe. We have a profound--some would say exorbitant--faith in the perfectibility of man. Yet we are intensely suspicious of the concentration of power, either economic or political. We place our faith, therefore, in a system of accountability which is based on the openness and transparency of government, the zeal of a free press, and the integrity of an independent judiciary.

At the same time, we are committed to a process of change: technological change, economic change, and, unavoidably, political and social change. For us it is not a question of how to avoid change. It is rather a question of how change can best be managed

and absorbed. It is our acceptance of change that perhaps most distinguishes us from the older nations of Europe, and which most identifies us with the newer, vibrant societies of the developing world. We have no commitment to a blind, relentless defense of the status quo. We are realistic enough to accept the inevitability of change and confident enough to believe that change can be managed so as to bring benefits to the bulk of the population.

Our approach to the rest of the world is based on these same principles and concepts:

- --Having ourselves struggled to gain our independence as a nation, we have been a consistent champion of national independence for other countries;
- --As perhaps the most pluralistic and diverse society the world has ever known, we have a strong bias toward pluralist democracy, as a unifying system of government in other nations.
- --Intensely suspicious of elitist pretentions and the concentration of power, we are unwavering believers in the need for transparency and accountability in government.

--Ourselves the beneficiaries of change, we are convinced that change cannot be resisted. We are confident that when it is accommodated an open, competitive system, change is a positive process.

--As a nation committed to the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes, we are opposed to the use of violence and subversion as instruments of political change.

Pluralism, competition, change, and accountability have worked for us. We do not see ourselves as unique. We believe these same principles work for others.

We have also learned that, because of our particular national experience, our approach toward the rest of the world cannot be divorced from the fundamental values on which our own society is based. Thus, our foreign policy encompasses an extra dimension, giving it a far more profound content than some narrow calculation of our own national interest. Secretary of State George Shultz put it well in a recent speech on the objectives of American foreign policy when he said:

"Finally, and most importantly, among the broader objectives of American foreign policy in the coming years are goals that are not technical or material but moral. The United States has always stood for the rule of law as a civilizing force in international relations; our foreign policy has always embodied a commitment to foster democracy, freedom, and human rights."

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We have learned the hard way that if we lose sight of these fundamental values in our foreign policy, we will not succeed. An American foreign policy which is not grounded in our own democratic values will not be supported by the American people and cannot be sustained.

skeptics and critics argue that our stress on democracy is either a reflection of hopeless naivete with no hope of realization in any but a very few countries, or a cynical shield behind which we exercise some sort of real politik. But let's look at the facts. They show quite a different reality. They show that the democratic ideal is a powerful and effective tool of our foreign policy.

First, it is a matter of historical record that democracies offer little threat to their neighbors. Democracies are able to resolve differences with one another through diplomacy and compromise, without the threat or use of force. Thus, the promotion of democracy, contributes directly to our interest in the peaceful settlement of disputes among nations.

Second, it seems to us undeniable that democratic countries are much more successful in absorbing technological and societal change. Their institutions give them the internal flexibility and resiliency needed to accommodate pressures from shifting internal constituencies. Through a process of pragmatic political compromise, these countries readjust and redefine their social compact, forging and reforging national consensus. As we have seen in recent years, most notably perhaps in Iran, those countries in which power is concentrated in the hands of a few and which lack institutional mechanisms to assist internal compromise are less able to accommodate pressures for change. Change may be resisted, but when it breaks through—as it inevitably will—it disrupts societies and even tears them asunder.

Third, pluralistic systems are most effective in stimulating and sustaining economic growth. Because they encourage competition and provide a process of self-correcting accountability, democratic societies are better able to avoid rigidities in economic markets and are better able to "deliver the goods" to their citizens.

Fourth, democracy is the only truly effective guarantor of human rights. Only when those doing the governing are fully accountable to those being governed through regular, open elections and an independent judicial process can human rights be fully secured.

And finally, functioning democratic systems have proven to be a strong defense against Communist penetration and subversion. People who live within a democratic system with individual freedom and guarantees of justice are not susceptible to the blandishments of Marxism-Leninism. In effect, democracy has proven to be the most effective doctrine of national security. This is being demonstrated in El Salvador, where a still fragile but rapidly growing democratic process is cutting the ground from under a major Communist insurgency.

The record of democracy in recent years is an encouraging, even an exhilerating one. In Latin America, for example, more than ninety percent of the population now live in countries which are either fully functioning democracies or are countries which are well along the road to democracy with popularly elected governments. Five years ago, only 35 percent of Latin Americans lived under democratic systems. But Argentina, Honduras, Brazil, Bolivia, Panama, and El Salvador have now joined Venezuela, Colombia and others in the democratic column. Credit for the success of democracy must go to Latin Americans themselves. They are the ones who worked, sacrificed, and risked. But United States support for their efforts has been unrelenting, and we take great satisfaction in the surge of this democratic wave.

Our support for the establishment and strengthening of democratic institutions is not, of course, limited to Latin America. Here in the Philippines the democratic ideal strikes deep chords of resonance. Democracy has a long history in this country. We Americans sometimes forget that the struggle for democracy began well in advance of our own arrival here.

The writings of Filipino patriots like Marcelo H. Del Pilar, Jose Rizal, Emilio Jacinto and those of the great theoretician of the Philippine Revolution, Apolinario Mabini, expound a number of concepts which are very familiar to Americans:

- --All men are born with "natural rights" which no one may usurp;
- --Governments are established to protect these "natural rights" of their citizens; and
- --Governments derive their power from the consent of the governed.

Thus, the Filipino democratic tradition is homegrown. It is not simply some transplanted American hybrid. Nonetheless, we do take some satisfaction in having helped to give life and substance to long-standing aspirations for democratic government in the Philippines. During the early years of our colonial presence here and, most importantly, during the Commonwealth period, the Philippines acquired practical experience in the democratic system, a system which continued, to flourish after your independence. This experience with functioning democracy, with its roots in the uniquely Filipino democratic thought of the 19th century, constitutes a fundamental part of your national heritage.

It is not surprising, therefore, that there is now such a strong, national effort to revitalize your democratic institutions and to assure that they function fully. It is similarly not surprising that the United States, by reason of our own values, our unique experience here in the Philippines, and our unwavering faith in the strength of democracy, fully and unswervingly supports this Filipino effort.

It is clear, I believe, that a process of political change is underway in this country. It is not necessary or indeed appropriate for us to express our views on each issue as it arises. That is the responsibility and prerogative of the Filipino people, speaking and acting through their own institutions and expressing their judgment in free, open elections.

But as friends, nd as passionate observers of events here, we do conclude that the process of change is healthy and constructive. There is a greater degree of pluralism in the political system. There is an increasing transparency in the process of public administration. And there is just, this week, new, dramatic evidence of progress in the strengthening of a process of accountability. These are all trends which can only add to your national strength, to the international credibility of your nation and government, and to the reconciliation of national differences. We recognize that many Filipinos are concerned about the pace of change; some consider it too slow and some fear it may be too rapid. That is a balance you will strike yourselves through the interplay of your political process.

One final point. We remain convinced that here in the Philippines, as in many other countries, a vigorous, functioning democratic system is not only feasible, but must and indeed will be achieved. Here in the Philippines, democracy can be your national security doctrine.

In his classic work, El Filibusterismo, Jose Rizal wrote:

"Governments are established for the welfare of the people, and in order to accomplish this purpose they have to follow the suggestions of the citizens, who are the ones best qualified to understand their own needs."

That thought is the lynchpin of the democratic ideal. It is the concept on which our own government is based, and it is clearly the preferred concept of government of the overwhelming majority of the Filipino people.

You can count on our firm unwavering support. We do not seek to substitute our judgment for yours. But we consider ourselves activists in the struggle for democracy. As President Reagan put it when he addressed the British Parliament in 1982: "We must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few, but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings."

Thank you very much.